BLOTTO GAME IN A PROPAGANDA BATTLE
https://doi.org/10.23947/2587-8999-2022-1-3-104-120
Abstract
The model describes the following process. Two parties, called Left and Right, are involved in information warfare on two topics that play the role of battlefields. Each party has limited broadcasting resources for propaganda, which each allocates between these two topics. Each member of the population backs one of the parties for each topic. A situation is possible in which an individual backs different parties on different topics. In this case, the individual is considered a supporter of the party supported on a more salient topic. Party supporters participate in participatory propaganda, campaigning on the topic or two topics they support for their party. The saliency of a topic depends on the amount of media broadcasting and communication on it. The number of party supporters’ changes over time under the influence of media and party propaganda. The problem is to determine the parties' best strategies.
Each party apportion its broadcasting resource between two topics, thereby choosing its strategy. Therefore, a Blotto game appears. The Blotto game is a two-player zero-sum game in which the players distribute limited resources over several battlefields. In this matrix game, payoffs of the parties are the numbers of their supporters at the end of the propaganda battle. Numerical experiments were conducted in which these payoffs were calculated numerically and the obtained game was solved.
Typically, the best strategies are those where the resource is allocated between the topics very unevenly. Moreover, often the best strategy is spending all the resource on one topic.
Supporting agencies: The research was supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project 20-01-00229).
About the Author
O. G. Podlipskaia
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Olga Podlipskaia, Department of Higher Mathematics, Associate Professor
9 Institutskiy per., Dolgoprudny, Moscow Region, 141701, Russian Federation
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For citations:
Podlipskaia O.G. BLOTTO GAME IN A PROPAGANDA BATTLE. Computational Mathematics and Information Technologies. 2022;6(3):114-112. https://doi.org/10.23947/2587-8999-2022-1-3-104-120
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